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In a previous paper certain measurable criteria have
been derived, that are sufficient to demonstrate the existence
of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) correlations for measure-
ments with continuous variable outcomes. Here it is shown
how such EPR criteria, which do not demand perfect EPR
correlations, can be used to prove the extent of security for
continuous variable quantum cryptographic schemes (in anal-
ogy to that proposed by Ekert) where Alice and Bob hope
to construct a secure sequence of values from measurements
performed on continuous-variable EPR-correlated fields sent
from a distant source. It is proven that the demonstration of
the EPR criterion on Alice’s and Bob’s joint statistics com-
pels a necessary loss in the ability to infer the results shared
by Alice and Bob, by measurements performed on any third
channel potentially representing an eavesdropper (Eve). This
result makes no assumption about the nature of the quantum
source of the fields transmitted to Alice and Bob, except that
the EPR correlations are observed at the final detector loca-
tions. In this way a means is provided to establish security
in the presence of some loss and less than optimal correla-
tion, and against any eavesdropping strategy employed by
Eve prior to detection of the fields by Alice and Bob.
I. INTRODUCTION
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [1] (EPR) presented a
now famous argument in 1935 in an attempt to show that
quantum mechanics is an “incomplete” theory. Their
argument was based on the premise of “no action-at-
a-distance” and made assumptions about the nature of
“reality”. In 1966 Bell [2] showed that the predictions
of all theories (called local hidden variable theories) con-
sistent with these EPR premises would satisfy certain
constraints called Bell inequalities. He also showed that
for some situations the predictions of quantum mechanics
will violate these Bell inequalities, meaning an incompat-
ibility of quantum mechanics with local hidden variables.
While Bell’s original work, and subsequent experi-
ments relating to it, applied to situation of discrete spin
measurements, the original EPR argument was presented
for “position” and “momentum” measurements with con-
tinuous variable outcomes. The experimental observation
of such continuous variable EPR correlations have been
achieved [3–5] using fields, where the conjugate “posi-
tion” and “momentum” observables are replaced by the
two orthogonal noncommuting quadrature phase ampli-
tudes of the field [6]. The theoretical proposal [7,8] relat-
ing to these experiments employed a two-mode squeezed
state [9] as the source of EPR fields. For such experi-
ments it is not possible to demonstrate the perfect cor-
relation as discussed originally by EPR. The experimen-
tal signatures are based on a criterion first presented [7]
in 1989, and expanded on in a recent paper [10]. The
EPR fields generated through the two-mode squeezing
interaction have enabled the experimental realization of
a continuous variable quantum teleportation [11].
Quantum cryptography using squeezed or two-mode
squeezed states predicting EPR correlations for quadra-
ture phase amplitude measurements with continu-
ous variable outcomes have been recently investi-
gated [12–19]. Of particular interest here is the contin-
uous variable quantum cryptographic scheme [14,16,17]
analogous to that discussed by Ekert [20] for spin-1/2
systems where Alice and Bob wish to construct a secure
key from correlated data sent to each of their locations
from an entangled continuous variable EPR source. The
original proposal of Ekert proposed to use the correlated
spin state shown by Bohm [21] to demonstrate a ver-
sion of the EPR paradox relating to measurements with
discrete outcomes. Bell showed in 1966 that this state
(the Bell-state) violates a Bell inequality, and in Ekert’s
proposal the violation of the Bell inequality is used to
demonstrate security.
The direct continuous variable “position /momentum”
measurements that demonstrate the EPR paradox for the
two-mode squeezed state cannot by any simple rotation
of measurement angle demonstrate a violation of a Bell
inequality. The point of this paper is to emphasize that
this does not however diminish the usefulness of such
a state in for example providing secure mechanisms for
quantum cryptography protocols, since one can replace
the Bell-inequality used in Ekert’s protocol by an EPR-
criterion to test for security.
In this paper we prove how the demonstration of EPR
correlations, using the 1989 EPR criterion, by Alice and
Bob on their two detected channels puts a limit on the
accuracy of any inference made by Eve, about the results
of the measurements performed by Alice and Bob. Im-
portantly this is proved for any quantum source, mean-
ing security against any strategies Eve is able to employ
prior to Alice and Bob detecting the fields.
To summarize the conclusions of this paper, it is shown
that the determination by Alice and Bob of a perfect,
maximum EPR correlation in their detected fields im-
plies security against any hypothetical Eve obtaining the
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key sequence. If Eve has intercepted one or both of the
EPR channels (from the source to Bob or from the source
to Alice) in any manner, to obtain the key sequence with
any degree of accuracy (to give a noninfinite variance in
her estimate of the values), then it is proved that the EPR
correlation detected by Alice and Bob could no longer be
maximum. It has also been proved that there is no al-
ternative set of quantum fields (source) available to Eve,
that would enable her to obtain the key sequence with
any degree of accuracy, and still retain the optimal EPR
correlation measurable between Bob and Alice.
The situation where a reduced EPR correlation is ob-
served between Alice and Bob is more subtle. Alice and
Bob would expect a certain degree of EPR correlation
based on measurements performed on their EPR source
(and perhaps an expected degree of loss on transmission).
If their measured EPR correlation is noticeably reduced
on one particular transmission then this could indicate
Eve’s presence (through extra loss) on Bob’s channel, and
certainly it would be wise to retransmit. However even
in such a situation where eavesdropping might have oc-
curred, (or in the situation where the EPR correlation is
apparently as expected but where it cannot be excluded
that Eve has substituted a different quantum source), our
procedure allows a deduction of the minimum degree of
fuzziness of Eve’s estimate of the key values shared by
Alice and Bob.
The strategy here is to derive limits on Eve’s knowledge
of the key sequence, based only on the reliable measure-
ment of a certain amount of EPR correlation between
Alice and Bob. This result is of current relevance in that
fixed amounts of EPR correlation for continuous variable
outcomes have been (irrefutably) confirmed experimen-
tally (whereas Bell inequality violations have not). The
proposal is to then use these limits to encode the message
in such a way as to elude Eve.
II. EPR CRITERIA BASED ON CONDITIONAL
MEASUREMENTS
We first need to define the EPR criteria, and here the
results of a previous paper [7,10] are summarized. Con-
sider two quantum fields propagating towards two spa-
tially separated location at A and B respectively. The
fields will be generated by a appropriate quantum source
so that the results of certain measurements are corre-
lated. Two observables xˆ (the “position”) and pˆ (“mo-
mentum”) are defined for the subsystem at location A.
These observables satisfy an uncertainty relation
∆xˆ∆pˆ ≥ C (1)
but where we will consider from this point on that with
appropriate scaling the xˆ and pˆ are now dimensionless
and C = 1. A measurement xˆB made at B gives a result
xBi . In this paper, i is used to label the possible re-
sults, discrete or otherwise, of the measurement xˆB. The
results of measurements xˆ and xˆB at A and B are corre-
lated, so that the measurement at B enables a prediction
to be made about the result of a measurement xˆ at A. We
define a set of distributions P (x|xBi ) giving the probabil-
ity of a result x for the measurement at A, conditional
on a result xBi for measurement at B. The variance and
mean of the conditional distribution P (x|xBi ) are denoted
by ∆2i x and µi respectively.
Also, for certain correlated fields, we can infer the re-
sult of measurement pˆ at A, based on a measurement, pˆB
say, at B. We denote the results of the measurement pˆB
at B by pBj . We also define the probability distribution,
P (p|pBj ) for obtaining the result p upon measurement of
pˆ at A, conditional on the result pBj for the measurement
pˆB at B. The variance of the conditional distribution
P (p|pBj ) is denoted by ∆2jp.
The situation discussed by Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
demands a perfect correlation between the result of mea-
surements xˆ at A and xˆB, and also between pˆ at A and
pˆB at B. For this case, the variances of the conditional
distributions must satisfy
∆ix = ∆jp = 0 (2)
for all i, j. This situation however is not achievable for
continuous variable measurements.
It has been discussed in the previous paper [10] how
EPR correlations would be demonstrated where one
can establish that each of the conditional distributions
P (x|xBi ) is very narrow, so that
P (x|xBi ) = 0 , where |x− µi| > δ (3)
and δ < 1. A similar result must be proved for each
P (p|pBj ). As discussed previously [10] this situation rep-
resents the spirit of the original EPR gedanken experi-
ment in its truest form, but is difficult to achieve exper-
imentally.
A more readily achieved criterion still sufficient to
demonstrate EPR correlations was proposed in 1989 [7]
and has been further explained in the previous paper [10].
We first define the weighted variance
∆2inf xˆ =
∑
i
P (xBi )∆i
2x (4)
and similarly
∆2inf pˆ =
∑
j
P (pBj )∆j
2p (5)
Here P (xBi ) is the probability for a result x
B
i upon mea-
surement of xˆB , and P (pj) is defined similarly. It has
been shown that the observation of
∆inf xˆ∆inf pˆ < 1 (6)
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implies a demonstration of EPR correlations (the EPR
paradox).
It is mentioned that the evaluation of the conditional
distributions for each outcome of the continuous vari-
able xBi at B is not always be practical. It has been
discussed [7,10] previously how it is possible to per-
form other measurements, closely related to squeezing
measurements, that are also sufficient to indicate the
EPR/entangled nature of the system. This is the ap-
proach used experimentally to date to demonstrate EPR
correlations. We propose upon a result xBi for the mea-
surement at B that the predicted or estimated value
for the result x at A is given by the linear estimate
xest = gx
B
i + d. The deviation δi = x − (gxBi + d) in
this linear estimate can in principle then be measured,
and an average over the different values of xBi evaluated.
We obtain as a measure of average error in our inference
of the result at A, based on the result at B, and using
this linear approach:
∆2inf,Lxˆ =
∑
xB
i
P (xBi )〈δ2〉i
= 〈{xˆ− (gxˆB + d)}2〉. (7)
The best linear estimate xest is the one that will minimize
∆2inf,Lxˆ. The best choice for g is discussed in [7]. Where
xest = µi it follows that the variance ∆
2
inf,Lxˆ = ∆
2
infx.
Generally however ∆2inf,Lxˆ ≥ ∆inf . The observation of
∆inf,Lxˆ∆inf,Lpˆ < 1 (8)
implies quantum inseparability, for any g and d, and also
the situation of the EPR paradox.
III. THE TWO-MODE SQUEEZED STATE AS
THE QUANTUM EPR SOURCE
Suppose the two quantum fields are generated via the
interaction Hamiltonian HI = ih¯κ(aˆ
†bˆ† − aˆbˆ), where aˆ
and bˆ symbolize the boson operators for the fields at A
and B respectively. For vacuum initial states this inter-
action generates, after a finite time t, two-mode squeezed
light [9]
|ψ >=
∞∑
n=0
cn|n >a |n >b (9)
where cn = tanh
nr/coshr and r = κt. This interaction
provides a quantum model for the parametric amplifier.
This simple quantum state was shown to be EPR-
correlated in reference [7], and EPR correlations using
parametric interactions and the criteria (8) have been
achieved experimentally. We define the quadrature phase
amplitudes
xˆ = Xˆa = (aˆ+ aˆ
†)
pˆ = Pˆa = (aˆ− aˆ†)/i
xˆB = Xˆb = (bˆ+ bˆ
†)
pˆB = Pˆb = (bˆ− bˆ†)/i (10)
that are measurable using local oscillator and homodyne
detection techniques that were developed originally in ef-
forts to generate and detect squeezed light. The Heisen-
berg uncertainty relation is ∆2Xa∆
2Pa ≥ 1.
It is seen from the linear EPR criterion (8) that the
following is also a criterion sufficent to demonstrate EPR
correlations in the spirit of the original EPR paradox:
∆(Xa − gXb)∆(Pa + hPb) < 1 (11)
where we have used the linear form
∆infx = ∆
2
inf,Lxˆ = 〈(Xa − gXb)2〉 (12)
and ∆2infp = ∆
2
inf,Lpˆ = 〈(Pa + hPb)2〉, and g and h are
parameters chosen to minimise the variances (the choice
of d is best at 0 since the quadrature amplitude means
for the vacuum squeezed state are zero).
The two-mode squeezed state predicts [7] (g = h =
tanh 2r) the correlationsXa = Xb, and Pa = −Pb to give
∆2inf,Lxˆ = ∆
2
inf,Lpˆ = 1/ cosh2r, (13)
a clear demonstration of EPR correlations for all r.
IV. THE CRYPOTOGRAPHIC SCHEME
We now consider the application of the EPR state
to quantum cryptography with continuous variable out-
comes. To summarize, an EPR source emits two fields,
one which propagates towards Alice at location A, and
the other to Bob at location B. As one possible strat-
egy, Alice selects to measure randomly either quadrature
phase amplitude Xa = xˆ, corresponding to angle θ = 0,
or quadrature phase amplitude Pa = pˆ, corresponding to
angle choice θ = pi/2, say. Similarly Bob will measure
randomly either quadrature phase amplitude Xb = xˆ
B ,
corresponding to angle φ = 0, or quadrature phase am-
plitude Pb = pˆ
B, corresponding to angle choice φ = pi/2.
As discussed in [10], and shown previously in [7], for the
choices θ = φ = 0, as the two-mode squeeze parameter r
becomes large, the results x of Alice’s measurement and
xBi for Bob’s measurement, will become identical. For
the choices θ = φ = pi/2 the results p for Alice and pBj
are also correlated (anticorrelated in fact): for large r we
have p = −pBj .
In the style of the original quantum cryptographic pro-
posals [20], we consider here the proposal where Alice
communicates to Bob after the measurements (through
a public channel) her choice of measurement angle θ and
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the result for the measurement, for a subensemble, ran-
domly selected after the detections. Bob is able to check
his measurements and compare his value for the result of
measurements that should be correlated with Alice’s.
Alice and Bob can then use their shared subensemble
to calculate the conditional probabilities P (x|xBi ) and
P (p|pBj ) and the associated respective variances ∆2i x,
∆2jp of these distributions defined in Section 2. Here x is
Alice’s result for xˆ, and xBi is the result for Bob’s mea-
surement (which we have symbolized by xˆB) correlated
with xˆ. Similarly p is Alice’s result for pˆ, and pBj is the
result for Bob’s measurement (symbolized by pˆB) anti-
correlated with pˆ. For our particular two-mode squeezed
state (9) the prediction is
∆ix = ∆jp = 1/
√
cosh 2r (14)
for all i, j.
The maintenance of the EPR correlation (between Al-
ice and Bob’s fields) is determined through examination
of the individual ∆ix or ∆jp, and through a measured
degree of violation of the 1989 EPR criteria (6). The pro-
posal is that this is used to check, or establish a degree
of, security.
For example if perfect EPR correlations are established
between Bob and Alice, it will be proved that there could
have been no intervention on the channels from the source
to Alice and Bob, or reconstruction of an alternative
source, by an eavesdropper Eve. Where Alice and Bob
are able to confirm narrow conditional distributions sat-
isfying (3), it is possible to establish the necessity of a
certain degree of fuzziness in Eve’s data. Once security
is established, the measurement angle for the remaining
subset is shared, and where the choice of angle is to pre-
dict correlation between results, the sequence of common
shared values can be used in some manner to form a key.
V. PROOF OF SECURITY
We now need to give the proof of security for such an
EPR scheme. It is assumed as usual that the choice of an-
gles θ and φ (whether to measure xˆ or pˆ) for Bob’s and
Alice’s measurements are randomly and independently
chosen after the transmission of the fields to Alice and
Bob at secure spatially separated locations. Alice and
Bob make delayed-choice measurements. Therefore we
assume that an eavesdropper (Eve) cannot anticipate the
angle choice prior to Alice and Bob receiving the fields.
This must also be true of the selection of the subensem-
ble used by Alice and Bob to evaluate the statistics to
test security. In this way it is assumed that the statistics
evaluated by Bob and Alice on the subensemble accu-
rately reflect the statistics of the entire fields received by
Alice and Bob.
It is the objective here to prove security against any
strategy Eve could adopt prior to the detection of the
transmitted fields by Alice and Bob. For example Eve
might interfere with and retransmit one or both of the
fields in some manner to forward to Alice and/ or Bob.
Alternatively she might sabotage the EPR source to sub-
stitute an alternative three-channeled correlated source,
where the three transmitted beams propagate to Alice,
Bob and also Eve at a third location. Eve could then po-
tentially perform a final measurement after public com-
munication of Alice’s angle choice. Alternatively, where
Alice and Bob use an EPR source with less than opti-
mal correlations, as would be the realistic situation, Eve
might replace the EPR source with one showing improved
EPR correlations. This might enable her to tap some of
the signal for the purpose of eavesdropping, while the de-
crease in EPR correlations that could be a consequence
of her tapping would go unnoticed by Alice and Bob who
expect a more weakly correlated signal anyway.
It is possible to consider cryptographic schemes where
security is established on the basis of the assumption of a
secure source, and also a secure channel from the source
to Alice (see for example [17]). In such schemes, the
tapping of the channel from the source to Bob shows as
a loss of EPR correlations which can be detected by Alice
and Bob, alerting them to Eve’s interference.
However for systems of perfect EPR correlation (such
as generated from the Bohm-Bell state used in the origi-
nal scheme of Ekert) a stronger proof of security is possi-
ble without these assumptions of secure source and sec-
ond EPR channel. It then becomes relevant to deter-
mine the extent of such security possible for the contin-
uous variable two-mode squeezed EPR state (9), whose
EPR correlations have been experimentally confirmed,
but which for finite squeeze parameter r is always less
than optimally correlated.
EPR
source Eve
Alice Bob
θ
φ
?
∆ix
∆iEp
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FIG. 1. EPR-correlated fields reach Alice and Bob who
perform delayed-choice measurements (“position” or “mo-
mentum”) as determined by the choice of θ or φ) at spatially
separated locations. The correlated results can then form the
shared values for a key. If Alice and Bob can prove that their
fields are EPR-correlated according to the 1989 criterion (6),
then it is impossible for any eavesdropper Eve at a third lo-
cation to have an accurate replica of the correlated results
shared by Alice and Bob. Eve’s estimate of Alice’s values are
necessarily less accurate than Bob’s, and the degree of inaccu-
racy can be evaluated from the details of the EPR-correlation.
This is true regardless of the nature of the original quantum
source.
The proof of security presented here then gives a
method to determine the level of security based only on
the nature of the measured statistics evaluated between
Alice and Bob after the detection of their fields, and
therefore involves no assumptions regarding the amount
of loss occurring during propagation or the nature of the
original quantum state. We present a proof of security by
demonstrating the impossibility of Eve, an eavesdropper
at a third spatial location, having (or being able to ob-
tain) a perfect copy of the results x, p shared by Alice and
Bob, if Alice and Bob measure through their subensem-
ble an EPR correlation based on their measurements ∆ix
and ∆jp (see Figure 1).
An eavesdropping process by Eve results in the gener-
ation of a final quantum state describable by a density
operator symbolized by ρ. For example if Eve attempts to
extract information by intercepting Bob’s channel, quan-
tum mechanically Eve’s measurement process is repre-
sented by a Hamiltonian that acts for some duration,
there being an initial quantum state describing Bob’s
and Eve’s (and Alice’s) fields. The final state ρ that
is produced after the interaction (we may also consider a
series of interactions that may involve destructive mea-
surements and state generation) describes Alice, Bob and
Eve’s final fields that are eventually detected and undergo
measurements by Alice, Bob and Eve at their different fi-
nal spatial locations.
Eve attempts to gain the results of Alice’s xˆ (or pˆ)
through some measurement on her field symbolized by
xˆE (and pˆE). The quantum state ρ predicts probability
distributions for the outcomes of all possible measure-
ments performed by Alice, Bob and Eve: for example
a probability distribution Px,x,p(x, x
B
i , p
E
q ) for the out-
comes x, xBi , p
E
q of Alice’s, Bob’s and Eve’s results of
measurement xˆ, xˆB , pˆE ; and also a Pp,x,p(p, x
B
i , p
E
q ) for
the outcomes p, xBi , p
E
q of Alice’s, Bob’s and Eve’s results
of measurement pˆ, xˆB , pˆE.
We define the probability P (x|{xBi , pEq }) of a result x
for Alice’s measurement of xˆ, conditional on the results
xBi and p
E
q for Bob’s xˆ
B and Eve’s pˆE respectively. We
also define the probability P (p|{xBi , pEq }) of a result p for
Alice’s measurement of pˆ, given the results xBi and p
E
q
for Bob’s xˆB and Eve’s pˆE respectively.
A constraint is placed on the variances ∆2i,qx and
∆2i,qp of the conditional distribution P (x|{xBi , pEq }) and
P (p|{xBi , pEq }) respectively, for any possible quantum
state ρ. The predicted statistics of Alice’s measure-
ments conditional on measurements performed by Bob
and Eve are described by the reduced density operator
ρA = 〈xBi |〈pEq |ρ|pEq 〉|xBi 〉/N (where N is a normalization
factor). The variance ∆2i,qx of the conditional distribu-
tion P (x|{xBi , pEq }) gives the uncertainty in the estimate
of Alice’s xˆ conditional on the results xBi and p
E
q for Bob’s
xˆB and Eve’s pˆE measurements. Bob’s (and Eve’s) mea-
surement constitutes a measurement of Alice’s xˆ, with
precision ∆i,qx. The uncertainty relation will imply the
constraint (for the quadratures as defined by (10), C = 1)
∆i,qp ≥ 1/∆i,qx (15)
The marginal distribution P (x|xBi ), the probability of
Alice’s result x for measurement xˆ conditional on the
result xBi for Bob’s measurement xˆ
B , is given by
P (x|xBi ) =
∑
pEq
Px,x,p(x, x
B
i , p
E
q )/P (x
B
i )
=
∑
pEq
P (x|{xBi , pEq })fpEq (16)
where fpEq is the fraction fpEq = P (x
B
i , p
E
q )/P (x
B
i );
P (xBi , p
E
q ) is the probability for result x
B
i and p
E
q , respec-
tively, upon joint measurement xˆB and pˆE ; and P (xBi ) is
the probability of xBi for Bob’s measurement of xˆ
B . This
implies the following relationship for the variance ∆2i x of
the conditional distribution P (x|xBi ).
∆2i x ≥
∑
pEq
fpEq ∆
2
i,qx (17)
The accuracy of the information obtainable by Eve is
determined by the standard deviation ∆Eq p of P
E(p|pEq ),
the conditional distribution for result p for Alice’s mea-
surement of pˆ given a result pEq for Eve’s pˆ
E . This
marginal distribution is given by
PE(p|pEq ) =
∑
xB
i
P (p|{xBi , pEq })fxB
i
(18)
where the fraction fxB
i
is defined as fxB
i
=
P (xBi , p
E
q )/P (p
E
q ); P (p
E
q ) is the probability for Eve’s re-
sult pEq upon measurement of pˆ
E. The ∆Eq p is related to
an average of these variances as given by
(∆Eq )
2 ≥
∑
xB
i
fxB
i
∆2i,qp (19)
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A. The case of perfect correlation
First we present a proof of security for the case where
Alice and Bob measure perfect EPR correlations, mean-
ing that all ∆ix = ∆jp = 0. This is the case if the
quantum source is a simultaneous eigenstate of Xa −Xb
and Pa + Pb, which is closest to the situation originally
defined by EPR. The variance ∆2ix is zero in this case
we consider initially of perfect EPR correlations. It must
follow therefore from (17) that each ∆i,qx is also zero.
Using the constraint (15) each ∆i,qp must then be infi-
nite. Therefore each ∆Eq p must also be infinite. Each
conditional variance, for all possible outcomes pEq , is in-
finite, meaning that any measurement performed by Eve
will give an infinite uncertainty in the prediction of Al-
ice’s p.
The same logic applied to joint measurements of Bob’s
pˆB and Eve’s xˆE implies an infinite variance for Eve’s
estimate of Alice’s x. In this way it is deduced that Eve’s
estimates of each of Alice and Bob’s sequential x, p values
(these constitute the final key) will have an associated
infinite uncertainty.
To summarize, the determination by Alice and Bob of
an optimal EPR correlation
∆ix = 0,∆jp = 0 (20)
for all i, j, in their detected fields implies security that
there can be no hypothetical Eve, at a third location as
indicated in Figure 1, able to obtain the key sequence.
This is proof that if Eve has intercepted one or both the
EPR channels to obtain the key sequence with any degree
of accuracy (so that there is a noninfinite variance in her
estimate of the Alice and Bob’s key values), the EPR
correlation would necessarily have been reduced to give a
nonzero result for at least one of the ∆ix, ∆jp. It has also
been proved that there is no alternative set of quantum
fields (source) available to Eve, that would allow her to
obtain the key sequence with any degree of accuracy and
still retain the optimal EPR correlation between Bob and
Alice.
B. The case of reduced correlation but where all
conditional distributions are narrow
Considering that a practical experiment will not have
perfect correlation (values of ∆ix might typically be 0.7
for current situations [5]), we need to argue more gener-
ally. It is still possible to derive limits on Eve’s knowledge
of the key sequence, based only on the reliable measure-
ment of a certain amount of EPR correlation between Al-
ice and Bob (and the assumption that Eve does not have
access to the random choice of Alice and Bob’s measure-
ment angles and subensemble selection, both of which
are selected after transmission and detection of the fields
by Alice and Bob). The proposal, such as that discussed
in Section 6, is to use these limits to encode the message
in such a way as to defeat Eve.
Based on Alice and Bob’s measurements over the
subensemble, the conditional probability distribution
P (x|xBi ) (and P (p|pBj )) can be measured by Alice and
Bob, and their associated variances ∆2ix (and ∆
2
jp) can
be evaluated. We examine in this subsection the case
where all conditional distributions measured by Alice and
Bob are shown to have a nonzero but small standard de-
viation, so that for example where these distributions
are Gaussian Alice and Bob demonstrate ∆ix < 1/3 and
∆jp < 1/3.
Most generally the variances such as ∆2ix are related
to the individual variances ∆2i,qx by the relation (17). Al-
though the ∆ix might be small, an individual ∆i,q might
not be. The possibility cannot be ruled out that Eve is
able to obtain upon some (small) fraction of her mea-
surements the result of Alice’s p to good accuracy. The
relationship given by (16) is certainly true however. Sup-
pose all (that is for all i) the conditional distributions
P (x|xBi ) measured by Alice and Bob are sufficiently nar-
row so that the probability of obtaining a result x outside
a range µi − δ ≤ x ≤ µi + δ is zero ie
P (x|xBi ) = 0 , for |x− µi| > δ (21)
and we assume δ < 1 (C = 1). A similar result must be
proved for each P (p|pBj ). Recall here µi is the mean of
the particular distribution P (x|xBi ). In this case based on
(16), we can say for sure that, for a given fixed xBi , each of
the P (x|{xBi , pEq }) must also satisfy P (x|{xBi , pEq }) = 0
outside the range µi± δ. This implies that each variance
∆2i,qx (of P (x|{xBi , pEq })) could not exceed the value of
δ2, implying in turn by (15) that each ∆i,qp must satisfy
∆i,qp ≥ 1/δ. (22)
In this way, since this is true for all i, and using (19),
it is proved that the uncertainty (standard deviation)
in each of Eve’s estimates of Alice’s p (this uncertainty
is the standard deviation of the conditional distribution
P (p|pEq ) as defined above) will exceed 1/δ.
∆Eq p ≥ 1/δ. (23)
For the two-mode EPR state (9), the conditional distri-
butions are predicted to be Gaussian with variance given
as ∆ix = ∆jp = 1/
√
cosh 2r. Of course the actual dis-
tributions must be measured by Alice and Bob as part
of the security procedure. For r sufficiently large so that
(recall δ ≤ 1)
∆ix < δ/3 ≤ 1/3 (24)
the Gaussian distribution is predicted to be negligible at
x > δ, and there is then proof that Eve’s best possible
estimates satisfy
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∆Eq p ≥ 1/δ. (25)
This means that as Eve performs the measurement pˆE to
obtain a result pEq , the standard deviation of the condi-
tional distribution PE(p|pEq ) (for Alice’s result p condi-
tional on Eve’s outcome) exceeds 1/δ for every possible
outcome pEq , and for all possible measurements pˆ
E . Sim-
ilar logic applied to Alice and Bob’s conditional distribu-
tions P (p|pBj ) gives a corresponding limit on the error in
each of Eve’s estimates of Alice’s result for xˆ.
In this way it is derived that a minimum degree of un-
certainty or fuzziness (as given by ∆Eq p ≥ 1/δ, ∆Eq p ≥
1/δ) exists for Eve’s estimate of every piece of the key
sequence shared by Alice and Bob. If ηEve is Eve’s esti-
mate of the particular key value, and η is Alice’s actual
key value, then we have 〈(ηEve − η)2〉1/2 ≥ 1/δ.
VI. A POSSIBLE ENCRYPTION PROTOCOL
Using the prediction for the two-mode squeezed state
∆inf xˆ = ∆inf pˆ = ∆j pˆ = ∆ixˆ = 1/
√
cosh 2r → 0 as
r → ∞, we see that as the squeeze parameter r = κt is
increased it becomes possible for Bob to resolve Alice’s
x or p value while Eve can only resolve with error →∞.
The measured quadrature phase amplitude values shared
between Alice and Bob form a secure key sequence de-
noted by the sequence ηm, m = 1, 2, . . .. We will define
the key ηm to consist of Alice’s relevant measured values
x (or p), though in the limit of r →∞ there is no devia-
tion of Bob’s measured values xBi (or p
B
j ) from Alice’s.
The data given by the variable zm is encoded, suppose
simplistically to give a transmitted classical amplitude
or number ym,sent = zm + Aηm (where A is a relative
amplification factor). The key ηm known to both Alice
and Bob enables Bob to decode the signal zm, whereas
Eve will have an infinite uncertainty in her measurement
of ηm, and therefore zm.
The chief difficulty for Alice and Bob comes for finite
r where the EPR correlation is reduced. Suppose ini-
tially that Alice and Bob’s measurements of the EPR
correlation and associated conditional distributions, en-
able them to establish that the probability distribution
P (x|xBi ) of Alice’s result x conditional on Bob’s result xBi
is a distribution with mean µi and standard deviation σ.
The two-mode squeezed state (9) predicts a Gaussian dis-
tribution µi = tanh rx
B
i for θ = 0 and σ = 1/
√
cosh 2r.
We suppose a similar result is achieved for P (p|pBj ):
(9) predicts the Gaussian with µj = − tanh rpBj and
σ = 1/
√
cosh 2κt.
Bob’s key sequence is the sequence ηm,Bob that he
builds up by selecting, for each of his relevant measure-
ments, ηm,Bob = µi where he obtained an outcome x
B
i
upon measurement of xˆB , or ηm,Bob = µj where he ob-
tained pBj upon measurement of pˆ
B. The deviation of
Bob’s key value from Alice’s key value is then
〈(ηm − ηm,Bob)2〉 = σ (26)
(The choice ηm,Bob = µi, µj made by Bob minimizes this
rms error.) Bob’s estimate of the decoded data zm is
zm,Bob = ym,sent −Aηm,Bob. His rms error is
〈(zm − zm,Bob)2〉 = A2〈(ηm − ηm,Bob)2〉
= A2σ2. (27)
A satisfactory binning by Alice of her data zm enable Al-
ice and Bob to share precisely such a signal sent by Al-
ice. This is determined by Alice and Bob, based on their
knowledge of the conditional statistics measured over the
subensemble. For example let us assume that Alice and
Bob’s distributions are Gaussian. In this case there is a
negligible chance (.0027) of |ηm − ηm,Bob| being greater
than 3σ, so that if Alice restricts the zm to be one of a
series of numbers separated by 6Aσ, then Bob will round
off correctly to reconstruct the correct signal.
However Eve’s decoded data is zm,E = ym,sent −
Aηm,Eve where ηm,Eve is Eve’s key. Consider the situ-
ation discussed above in equation (24) where every one
of Bob’s measured conditionals are Gaussian and satisfy
∆ix = ∆jp = σ = δ/3 (δ < 1). With (25) we conclude
that each standard deviation of Eve’s conditional distri-
butions PE(x|xEr ) and PE(p|pEq ) satisfies ∆Eq p > 1/δ,
∆Er x > 1/δ. The rms error of Eve’s signal must satisfy
(σ = δ/3)
〈(zm − zm,Eve)2〉 = A2〈(ηm − ηm,Eve)2〉
≥ A2/δ2 = A2/9σ2 (28)
Suppose Bob and Alice’s correlation reveals σ = 1/3
(which is the largest value that is sensible to this par-
ticular approach). Then Eve’s best could not do better
than 〈(zm − zm,Eve)2〉1/2 = A.
On the basis of the assumption of a particular form
for Eve’s conditional distributions P (x|xEq ) and P (p|pEr )
(eg Gaussian), a minimum error rate for Eve’s informa-
tion could be calculated. The probability of Eve eval-
uating Alice’s zm outside of the range zm ± 3Aσ, and
to therefore establish the incorrect value for z, is signifi-
cant if Eve’s conditional distributions are Gaussian (the
probability of an incorrect zm,Eve being 0.3173). The
Gaussian calculation for Eve’s error rate is relevant, in
that the EPR channels generated from the source (9),
and subsequently interfered with by Eve through mecha-
nisms able to be modeled by linear interaction Hamilto-
nians/couplings such as ( ˆaEve and bˆ symbolize the boson
operators for Eve’s and Bob’s fields respectively)
HI = κ(aˆ
†
Evebˆ
† + aˆEvebˆ) (29)
with vacuum or squeezed state inputs, would predict such
Gaussian conditional distributions. Examples of such lin-
ear eavesdropping strategies, have been discussed previ-
ously [12–15].
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It is noted however that while a limit is placed on the
variances of Eve’s conditionals, the form of these distri-
butions has not been constrained by the very general ap-
proach presented here. For example Eve’s eavesdropping
might produce an ηm,Eve that has a significant probabil-
ity peak located at or near zero, meaning that a signifi-
cant number of the zm will be read with no error. Alice
and Bob would need to use the fact that then necessarily
other measurements performed by Eve must have very
significant deviation from the true zm value as part of
the encoding scheme. A more sophisticated scheme is re-
quired, as for example one based on a scrambling of data
where every value of the zm is needed to descramble com-
pletely, and where significant single errors in a zm or ηm
value compound Eve’s reduced ability to decode.
VII. PROOF OF SECURITY FOR WEAKER
CORRELATION
The above protocol requires narrow conditional dis-
tributions, ∆ix,∆jp < 1/3 (ie σ < 1/3 for Gaus-
sian distributions). With reported measured values of
∆2infx =
∑
i P (xi)∆
2
i x ≈ 0.7 such a value is proba-
bly not currently achievable. Here we present a more
general strategy which can apply where variances satisfy
∆ix < .57, ∆jp < .57.
We define the set of probabilities {P (xEr ), P (pEq )} and
uncertainties {∆Er x,∆Eq p} which determine the accuracy
of Eve’s information on the key sequence (this being Al-
ice’s sequence of relevant xˆ,pˆ results). Here P (xEr ) is the
probability of Eve obtaining a result xEr upon a measure-
ment xˆE , and ∆Er x is the standard deviation of the prob-
ability distribution PE(x|xEr ) for Alice’s result x for xˆ,
conditional on Eve’s result xEr for xˆ
E . This set must be
compared with the set of probabilities {P (xBi ), P (pBj )}
and uncertainties {∆ix,∆jp} that determine Bob’s ac-
curacy of information of Alice’s x, p data.
First, where the correlation between Alice’s and Bob’s
data is sufficient to satisfy the 1989 criteria (6) for EPR,
it can be shown that the sets of statistics are necessarily
different: that determining Eve’s information involving
greater uncertainties than that determining Bob’s infor-
mation. We show this as follows.
If we assume that Eve’s set is identical to Bob’s, we
obtain a contradiction. We could define the joint prob-
ability Pi,q = P (x
B
i , p
E
q ) of the result x
B
i for Bob’s mea-
surement xˆB and of the result pEq for Eve’s measure-
ment pˆE As before we define the variances ∆2i,qx and
∆2i,qp of the probability distributions for Alice’s result of
measurement xˆ and pˆ respectively, conditional on Bob’s
and Eve’s results xBi p
E
q . The prediction for the aver-
age conditional variance (as measured by Alice and Bob)
is given by ∆2inf xˆ =
∑
i P (x
B
i )∆i
2x. Also if Eve’s in-
ferred statistics are to be the same as Bob’s, the quantity
∆Einf
2pˆ =
∑
q P (p
E
q )(∆
E
q p)
2 measured on Eve’s statis-
tics must equal Alice and Bob’s measure of the average
∆2infp. Applying (17) and (19) and the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality we would always predict
∆2inf xˆ∆
2
inf pˆ = ∆
2
inf xˆ∆
E
inf
2pˆ
= (
∑
i
P (xBi )∆i
2x)(
∑
q
P (pEq )(∆
E
q p)
2)
≥ (
∑
i,q
P (xBi )fpEq ∆
2
i,qx)(
∑
i,q
P (pEq )fxB
i
∆2i,qp)
= (
∑
i,q
Pi,q∆
2
i,qx)(
∑
i,q
Pi,q∆
2
i,qp)
= 〈∆i,q2x〉〈∆i,q2p〉
≥ |〈∆i,qx∆Ei,qp〉|2 ≥ 1 (30)
This is not the case given that Bob’s and Alice’s statis-
tics show the 1989 EPR criterion. In other words, the
demonstration of the EPR criteria for Bob’s and Alice’s
statistics ensures that there is a loss of information, as
compared to Bob, on Eve’s channel.
An increase in Eve’s error of inference on the data
shared by Alice and Bob follows necessarily from Alice
and Bob’s measurements of the general EPR correlations
using the 1989 criterion. It is required however to employ
this fact in a satisfactory way to enable Bob full informa-
tion on a signal transmitted by Alice, while leaving Eve
unable to decode. Above we have considered strategies
where all conditionals have narrow variances (∆ix < .3,
∆jp < .3 for all i, j) in the fashion of a strong EPR
paradox.
Now we consider particular strategies for the situation
of inference variances ∆infx > .3. First it is possible to
prove that
∆Einfp ≥ 1/∆infx (31)
From result (19) we have
(∆Einf )
2p =
∑
q
P (pEq )(∆
E
q )
2p
≥
∑
i,q
P (xBi , p
E
q )∆
2
i,qp (32)
∆2infx =
∑
i
P (xBi )∆
2
ix
≥
∑
i,q
P (xBi , p
E
q )∆
2
i,qx (33)
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and (15) we obtain
(31).
Let us suppose then that Alice and Bob establish a
uniform set of Gaussian conditional distributions with
variances
∆ix = ∆jp = ∆infx = σ < 1. (34)
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Alice can choose to bin her signal values to the nearest
number of a sequence separated by 6Aσ, as described in
Section 6. For the case where the two-mode squeezed
state is used as a source the conditional distributions are
Gaussian (this must be verified by Alice and Bob upon
measurements). The probability of Bob decoding the
wrong signal value (this is the probability that his value
for the key deviates from Alice’s by more than three stan-
dard deviations) is therefore negligible (.0027), meaning
that Bob can use his slightly fuzzy key to decode correct
signal values.
The average deviation of Eve’s estimate (the mean of
her conditional distribution) from Alice’s measured key
value x (or p) is given by the average variances of her
conditional distributions. These must satisfy
∆Einfp ≥ 1/σ
∆Einfx ≥ 1/σ. (35)
The probability of an error (that Eve will decode Alice’s
signal zm incorrectly) is the probability that Eve’s condi-
tional distributions (PE(x/xEr ), P
E(p/pEq )) deviate from
the mean by an amount greater than 3σ.
First, provided 1/σ > 3σ (σ < .57), it is necessary
that Eve, in order to achieve an average variance ∆Einfp
or ∆Einfx satisfying (35), will have key values deviating
from Alice’s key value by an amount greater than 3σ:
|ηm − ηm,Eve| > 3σ for some value of ηm,Eve. This is
true for any hypothetical eavesdropping scheme Eve might
have employed. In other words it is proven that Eve will
decode at some point to obtain wrong signal value zm
sent by Alice. Of course the signal values zm that are now
shared accurately by Alice and Bob, but not by Eve, need
not form the final message, but can be used as a discrete
key to encode a further signal.
A calculation of the Eve’s error rate based on the as-
sumption that her conditionals are Gaussian distribu-
tions with equal ∆Eq is however immediately possible,
for any δ < 1. For example, where σ = ∆ix = ∆jp =
∆infx = ∆infp = .57, the probability of Eve’s error is
.32.
Of course as discussed in Section 6, for absolutely se-
cure cryptography, the exact nature of Eve’s conditional
distributions cannot be measured by Alice and Bob and
therefore cannot be assumed. Since in (35) we only re-
strict the average inference error, we have not ruled out
that Eve is able to achieve very narrow conditional dis-
tributions for most q, to obtain the correct result for
Alice’s signal for most of the signal sequence. This situ-
ation however could only be achieved if Eve has a very
significant ∆qx, for some q, and therefore a high devia-
tion between Alice’s and Eve’s measured key values for
some of the key sequence, which would cause a large de-
viation zm,Eve− zm of Eve’s decoded signal from Alice’s,
for some m. As discussed in Section 6, the encoding pro-
tocol would then need to make use of, not only an Eve’s
error rate, but of possibly large individual errors, to re-
duce her ability to decipher any final message.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is proved in this paper that fields demonstrated by
Alice and Bob (at two spatially separated locations) to
have certain EPR correlations, enable Alice and Bob to
share the results of measurements to a great accuracy.
This accurate knowledge of a sequence of results of cer-
tain measurements cannot be shared by a third experi-
menter or eavesdropper Eve at a different location. In
the case of EPR correlations that are less than ideal, cer-
tain limits on Eve’s accuracy of inference of the sequence
of values that form the key have been derived. This con-
clusion makes no assumptions about loss or the nature
of the quantum source, except that EPR correlations are
measured by Alice and Bob, and therefore provides a se-
curity against all strategies Eve may take to eavesdrop
prior to Alice and Bob receiving the fields.
For situations where EPR correlations between Bob
and Alice are not perfect, it is still possible for Alice
and Bob to reconstruct a shared key or signal sequence
where the values are shared with perfect accuracy. The
fuzziness placed on Eve’s key values means that Eve will
necessarily at some point decipher incorrectly, and some
specific strategies are presented for the case where the av-
erages of the variances of Bob’s conditional distributions
(determining Alice’s result based on his measurements)
satisfy ∆infx < .57 and ∆infp < .57. Specific error rates
for Eve’s key or decoded signal can be established where
a particular form (for example a Gaussian as would be
the case for various linear eavesdropping strategies) for
her conditional distributions are assumed. Generally, the
given encoding scheme must use Eve’s proven nonzero
error rate for a key sequence to establish that it is not
practical for Eve to decipher a final message.
Lastly a comment must be made on what could be con-
cluded on the basis of measurements that would appear
to be currently achievable (∆infx < .57 probably is not).
Reported measurements are close to ∆infx = ∆infp =
.7. The inference variances are measured experimentally
in this case through the linear estimate described by (12).
Our results (31) then prove that Eve’s conditionals sat-
isfy ∆Einfx > 1.4, ∆
E
infp > 1.4. Assuming that the con-
ditionals could be measured to be Gaussian and uniform
with a standard deviation σ = ∆ix = ∆jp = .7, we could
apply the strategy discussed in Section 6 to allow Bob to
share Alice’s discretized data without significant error.
The probability of Bob making an error is the probabil-
ity that the conditional distribution gives greater than
3σ = 2.1 (a negligible error rate of .0027).
If we assume Eve’s conditional distributions are also
Gaussian, then her standard deviation is at least 1.4
and her error rate is at least 0.136, fifty times greater
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than Bob’s. This gives a proven measure of a level of se-
curity against all eavesdropping strategies employed by
Eve that would result in her conditionals being Gaus-
sian. Such strategies include the use of any two-mode
squeezed state-EPR source of the type (9) generated by
the parametric amplification discussed in Section 3, in
conjunction with any lossy mechanisms or eavesdropping
strategies involving linear beamsplitters such as given by
the coupling (29). We cannot prove this generally how-
ever for any strategy taken by Eve, since she may have a
conditional distribution with standard deviation 1.4 but
where none of her results deviate from the mean by more
than 2.1 (to give the same error rate on Alice’s discretized
data as Bob’s). It is noted in conclusion however that it
has been proved generally (see equation (30)) that Eve’s
estimates of the continuous values that form Alice’s orig-
inal key sequence are more fuzzy than Bob’s.
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